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INTRODUCTION

Non-culpable childrenfaced with the criminalprocess must be protected,
not by the state, but from the state. There is nothing uniue in the juvenile
process, including the concept of lesser culpability,that excludes it from this
conclusion. This, in sum, is the received wisdom of the last twenty-five years
ofjuvenile sociologicalandjurisprudentialstudy.1

More than two decades have passed since the Supreme Court rendered its landmark decision in In re Gault 2 The appellant, Gerald
Gault, had been committed at age fifteen to the Arizona State Industrial School "for the period of his minority [to age twenty-one], unless
sooner discharged by due process of law."3 Gerald lost his liberty for
up to six years because he had made a phone call of the "irritatingly
offensive, adolescent, sex variety."4 Had he been an adult convicted of
making an obscene phone call, he could have been sentenced only to a
fine of five to fifty dollars or imprisonment of up to two months.5 The
apparent injustice of the disposition was magnified by several facts:
Gerald's parents were not notified of his arrest; neither Gerald nor his
parents were notified of the charge; Gerald was not provided access to
counsel or the opportunity to summon and cross-examine witnesses;
and the judge interrogated Gerald during the hearing and compelled
him to testify against himself.
The egregious facts of Gerald's case unfortunately were common in
juvenile courts before Gault was decided. In Gaul4 though, the
Supreme Court majority joined in Justice Fortas's scathing critique of
the juvenile court as a 'kangaroo court."6 The Court added meaning to
this assessment by its proclamation for the first time that "neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."7
Accordingly, the Court held that the fact that Gerald had been tried in
juvenile rather than criminal court did not abrogate his constitutional
right to counsel,8 confrontation of witnesses, 9 notice of the charges,O
1. Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L REv.
503, 562 (1984) (emphasis added).

2. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

I& at 7-8.
Id. at 4.
Id.at 8-9.
Id at 28.
I. at 13.

8. Id. at 35.
9. I at 56.
10. Id. at 33.
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and exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination."
Gault promised radical change in juvenile justice. Founded on the
principle that rehabilitation should be the hallmark of the law's respouse to wayward youth, 12 juvenile courts rarely had recognized the
rights that were denied Gerald Gault by the Arizona trial court. In
fact, failure to provide the rudiments of due process was believed to be
consistent with the therapeutic aim of juvenile courts.' 3 As a result,
and because many juvenile judges had received no legal training at all,
juvenile justice was essentially lawless.14 Although the Supreme
Court stopped short of asserting that the juvenile court was a legal
innovation 15 that had completely failed,16 the Court left little doubt
that, as a matter of both law17 and policy,18 juvenile justice would have
to change radically if it was to survive scrutiny. As the Court noted in
a case subsequent to Gault:
[I]t is simply too late in the day to conclude... that a juvenile is not put in
jeopardy at a proceeding whose object is to determine whether he has commit11. Id. at 55.
12. See Levine, Ewing & Hager, Juvenileand Family MentalHealth Law in Sociohistorical Context, 10 INTL'L J. L. & PsYCHIATRY 91, 100-02 (1987).
13. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
14. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 n.14 (1967).
15. The juvenile court is a relatively youthful jurisprudential invention. Juvenile
codes were adopted in virtually every American jurisdiction in the first two decades of the twentieth century. See Levine, Ewing & Hager, supranote 12, at 10001.
16. The Court's opinion in Gaultsuggested that the juvenile court's failure to remediate delinquents was the result, at least in part, of a lack of adequate resources,
rather than inherent flaws. In re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967). This view was emphasized four years later in the Court's holding that the Constitution does not entitle
respondents in delinquency proceedings to a jury trial:
The juvenile concept held high promise. We are reluctant to say that,
despite disappointments of grave dimensions, it still does not hold promise, and we are particularly reluctant to say.. . that the system cannot
accomplish its rehabilitative goals. So much depends on the availability
of resources, on the interest and commitment of the public, on willingness to learn, and on understanding as to cause and effect and cure. In
this field, as in so many others, one perhaps learns best by doing. We are
reluctant to disallow the States to experiment further and to seek in new
and different ways the elusive answers to the problems of the young ....
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971).
17. Gault was a landmark case in many ways. Perhaps the most far-reaching was its
"constitutionalizing" children's issues. See supra notes 7-11. Accordingly, Gault
gave a clear message that juvenile courts would have to begin taking the rudiments of due process seriously.
18. In a statutory case that presaged Gault, the Court had concluded that a juvenile
respondent "receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). In Gault
itself, the Court made unmistakably clear its view that the juvenile court had
failed to accomplish its stated purposes and, indeed, that it had often operated in
countertherapeutic ways. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967).
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ted acts that violate a criminal law and whose potential consequences include
both the stigma inherent in such a determination and the deprivation of liberty for many years.1 9

With the abrogation of the myth that juvenile court proceedings were
on behalf of, rather than against, the respondents, it was reasonable to
expect that juvenile procedure after Gault and its progeny 2o would
differ little from criminal procedure.
However, the logic of Gault never was followed to its conclusion.
Although it is indisputable that Gault led to significant change in juvenile law,2 1 it is also clear that many juvenile courts have failed to
implement its mandate fully. Many juvenile courts persist in the illusion that they are therapeutic instruments22 and, accordingly, neglect
the due process rights basic to an adversary system. 23 Still more fundamentally, little attention has been given to the question of whether
a separate juvenile court can be justified at all when juvenile respondents are entitled to most of the procedural rights owed criminal
defendants.24
19. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 (1975).
20. Strictly speaking, Gault applied only to adjudicatory delinquency proceedings
leading to possible incarceration. See Rosenberg, The ConstitutionalRights of
Children Charged with Crime: Proposalfor a Return to the Not So DistantPast,
27 UCLA L. REv. 656, 662 nn.32-34 and citations therein. In subsequent cases, the
logic of Gault was applied to the standard of proof, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970); double jeopardy, Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); and retroactivity,
Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (per curiam).
21. Gault led to major revisions in juvenile codes to "legalize" juvenile courts with
subsequent major revisions to increase punitive responses to serious juvenile
crime. Prior to Gault,procedures were so minimally lawful that many juvenile
courts lacked law-trained judges. W. WADLINGTON, C. WHITEBREAD & S. DAVIS,
CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 229 (1983).
22. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-1801 (Supp. 1988):
The policy of the state of Idaho is hereby declared to be the establishment of a legal framework conducive to the constructive judicial processing of children's cases where the child's conduct is in conflict with the
law; and the providing of professional assistance to courts handling children's cases, through a coordinated program of rehabilitation, thereby
insuring integrated treatment and assistance to communities throughout
the state in their programs of prevention and control of juvenile delinquency ....
23. Several studies conducted in the late 1960s and early 1970s showed that Gault had
little effect on many juvenile courts. See, e.g., W. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM,
IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH (1972); Duffee & Siegel, The Organization Man: Legal
Counsel in the Juvenile Court,7 CRIM. L. BULL. 544 (1971); Platt, Schechter &
Tiffany, In Defense of Youth: A Case Study of the PublicDefender in Juvenile
Court, 43 IND. L.J. 619 (1968). Although directly comparable recent research is
not available, studies showing the frequency of an absence of defense counsel in
juvenile court, see infra note 132, raise questions about the court's continuing
unlawfulness in many jurisdictions.
24. Because of its adoption of a just deserts approach to juvenile disposition and its
application of the full panoply of criminal procedure to juvenile hearings, the
Juvenile Justice Standards Project is often characterized as having taken a radi-
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With more than two decades of post-Gault hindsight, this Article is
intended to stimulate new discussion of this issue. Perhaps the time
has come to follow Gault to its logical conclusion and to "put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding" and "once again to place the juvenile
squarely in the routine of the criminal process."25 Although I will not
go quite so far, I will argue that Gault and its progeny, when examined
in the light of empirical evidence, require a truly new juvenile court
that relies on knowledge of psychosocial development in order not to
treat juveniles, but to ensure protection of their right to due process.
II.

HISTORIC RATIONALES FOR THE JUVENILE COURT

In consideration of the social utility of the juvenile court and its
present and future mission and form, a useful starting point is analysis
of the Validity of the historic rationales for a separate juvenile court.26
Social historians now doubt that the founding of the juvenile court is
largely or even wholly explained by the stated motives of the turn-ofthe-century child savers. 27 However, examination of the ostensible rationales is most likely to provide an answer to the question of whether
any coherent justification exists for a separate juvenile court.
Jud,e Julian Mack's oft-cited contemporary discussion of the nature and goals of the early juvenile court 28 provides a snapshot of the
cal approach to juvenile justice. Besides the fact that a series of recommendations that could win the endorsement of the American Bar Association must not
be that radical, the commentary to the 23 volumes of Juvenile Justice Standards
is remarkable for its lack of attention to the question of whether a juvenile court
can be justified at all. The closest it comes to such a discussion is a footnote excerpting a conclusory statement from a position paper prepared for the Project:
"Juveniles may be viewed as incomplete adults, lacking in full moral and experiential development, extended unique jural status in other contexts, and deserving
of the social moratorium extended by this and all other societies of which I am
aware." ABA JOINT COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITIONS 19 n.5 (1980).

25. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
26. The Gault Court itself noted that parenspatriaedoctrine had been distorted substantially from its early purpose of protection of state interests in the estates of
dependent persons. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1967).
27. See generally J. KETT, RITES OF PASSAGE (1977); A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS:
THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977).
28. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909). Judge Mack's rather
romanticized account of the juvenile court itself bears some indicia of the sociopolitical determinants of the founding of the court, as identified by modern scholars.
Judge Mack provided this description of the clientele of the early juvenile court:
Most of the children who come before-the court are, naturally, the
children of the poor. In many cases the parents are foreigners, frequently unable to speak English, and without an understanding of
American methods and views. What they need, more than anything else,
is kindly assistance; and the aim of the court, in appointing a probation
officer for the child, is to have the child and the parents feel, not so much
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[The juvenile judgel must be a student of and deeply interested in the
problems of philanthropy and child life, as well as a lover of children. He
must be able to understand the boys' point of view and ideas of justice; he
must be willing and patient enough to search out the underlying causes of the
trouble and to formulate the plan by which, through the cooperation, ofttimes,
of many agencies, the cure may be effected....
The problem for determination by the judge is not, Has this boy or girl
committed a specific wrong, but What is he, how has he become what he is,
and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to
save him from a downward career. It is apparent at once that the ordinary
legal evidence in a criminal court is not the sort of evidence to be heard in
29
such a proceeding ....

A.

Juveniles Are Not Responsible
1.

The Legal Framework

At its deepest roots, this paternalistic vision of the juvenile court
was based on the moral premise that youth do not deserve punishment
for their violations of law. Rather, in Judge Mack's words, offenders
should be "protected" by the state, acting as would "a wise and
merciful father" when he learns that his child has erred.3 0 To pursue
that course, the court must concern itself not with the question of
whether a given disposition is a juvenile's just desert, but instead
whether the dispositional plan is responsive to his needs. Indeed, the
court need not worry about whether the juvenile deserves state intervention at all, because the intervention is for his own good, regardless
of whether he has broken the law:
[It is] the duty of the state, instead of asking merely whether a boy or girl has
committed a specific offense, to find out what he is, physically, mentally, morally, and then if it learns that he is treading the path that leads to criminality,
to take him in charge, not so much to punish as to reform, not to degrade but
to uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to make him a criminal but a worthy
citizen. 3 1

It is easy to approach Judge Mack's assertion cynically and to focus
solely on the adequacy of the juvenile court in delivering the promised
rehabilitation. Although the failings of the court in that regard now
the power, as the friendly interest of the state; to show them that the
object of the court is to help them to train the child right ....
Mack, supra, at 116-17.
29. Mack, supra note 28, at 119-20. In his dissenting opinion in Gault,Justice Stewart
summarized the import of the offender- rather than offense-based dispositional
inquiry in juvenile justice: "[A] juvenile proceeding's whole purpose and mission
is the very opposite of the mission and purpose of a prosecution in a criminal
court. The object of one is correction of a condition. The object of the other is
conviction and punishment for a criminal act." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 79
(1967)(Stewart, J., dissenting).
30. Mack, supra note 28, at 107.
31. Id.
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are well known 32, it is important to consider the validity of the underlying assumption that it is unjust to brand a juvenile as a criminal. 33
Even if the juvenile court has not matched the rehabilitative ideal, a
special system of justice may be defensible if retribution cannot be
morally applied to a juvenile.
Indeed, such a line of argument may require merely a showing that
youthfulness is a mitigating, even if not an excusing, factor. For example, in a "modest defense" of the juvenile court, my colleague Martin Gardner has contended that the court can be justified by the
discrepancy in level of stigma that may exist between delinquent and
criminal.34 If, as he argues, most juvenile offenders are sufficiently
mature that they are culpable for their conduct but sufficiently immature that they do not deserve the same level of punishment as adult
offenders, then an intermediate level of punishment is just. Given
that labeling by the community as a criminal is a part of the punishment meted out by the criminal justice system, a label with less stigma
would be appropriate for juvenile offenders. Therefore, Professor
Gardner favors retention of the juvenile court even though he accepts
a retributive response to most juvenile crime. Consistent with the
general principle that punishment should be proportionate to the offense, he would reduce both the sentence (disposition) and the opprobrium imposed on juveniles convicted of a crime, relative to the
sanctions to which adult offenders are subject. Although the first object of his partial responsibility theory could be accommodated in the
criminal justice system, 35 the latter may require that a special status
be maintained for juvenile offenders. 36
Still, the existence of a juvenile court clearly does not exclude punishment of juveniles, and the absence of a juvenile court does not eliminate the possibility of fully or partially exculpating juveniles on the
basis of their immaturity. Even at the zenith of the rehabilitative
ideal, some juveniles were expressly the objects of punishment,37 and
most juvenile offenders were subject to de facto punishment. 38 On the
other hand, for centuries prior to the invention of the juvenile court,
the defense of infancy operated in criminal courts to excuse the criminal conduct of all children under age seven and of those children be32. See infra Section II(B).

33. See Mack, supra note 28, at 109.
34. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice: Some Observations on a Recent Trend, 10
INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 129, 148-50 (1987).
35. See generally Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1984).

36. Professor Gardner's argument rests on an empirical assumption about the relative social consequences of the criminaland delinquent labels. He acknowledges
that the assumption is speculative. Gardner, supra note 34, at 149-50.
37. See Gardner, supra note 34, at 130 n.8.
38. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
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tween the ages of seven and fourteen who failed to appreciate the
wrongfulness of their conduct. 39
In short, the desirability of a juvenile court is not perfectly related
to the question of the criminal responsibility of juvenile offenders.
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that some relationship exists between
the modal level of responsibility of juvenile offenders and the agegraded applicability of the usual strictures of criminal law. If most
juvenile offenders are not worthy of punishment but the state has a
compelling interest, as it undeniably does, in the prevention of continuing antisocial behavior, then a nonretributive justice system is
needed to respond to the problem of juvenile delinquency. Therefore,
before conclusions are reached about the wisdom of a separate system
of juvenile justice, careful consideration is needed of the level of responsibility that may be justly expected of most juveniles.
2. The PsychologicalEvidence
a.

Changing Views of Children's Competence

Such questions are especially acute because of a large body of recent psycholegal scholarship that indicates juveniles, especially adolescents, commonly are more competent decisionmakers than the law
historically has presumed.40 Piagetian theory implied that adolescents, at least by age fourteen, would not differ from adults on average
in their ability to comprehend and weigh risks and benefits of personal decisions. 4 1 That general proposition now has been supported by
numerous laboratory42 and field studies 43 of decisionmaking by youth
in various legally relevant contexts.
In fact, if research contradicts the Piagetian hypotheses at all, it
generally is in the direction of competence of even younger minors to
make personal decisions. For example, some studies have shown elementary-school-age children able to identify material risks of psycho39. See generally Kean, The History of the CriminalLiability of Children,53 LAw Q.
REV. 364 (1937); Ludwig, Rationale of Responsibility for Young Offenders, 29
NEB. L. REv. 521 (1950); Walkover, supra note 1.
40. See generally Melton, Developmental Psychology and the Law: The State of the
Art; 22 J. FAM. L. 445, 452-56 (1983).
41. See Grisso & Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment A Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 412 (1978).
42. E.g., Belter & Grisso, Children'sRecognition of Rights Violations in Counseling,
15 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RES. & PRAC. 899 (1984); Weithorn & Campbell, The Competency of Children andAdults to Make Informed TreatmentDecisions,53 CHILD
DEv. 1589 (1982).
43. E.g., Day & Reznikoff, Social Class, The Treatment Process, and Parents' and
Children'sExpectations about Psychotherapy,9 J. CLIN. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 195
(1980); Lewis, A ComparisonofMinors'andAdults'PregnancyDecisions,50 AM.
J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446 (1980).
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therapy.44 Other research has indicated that children in the
intermediate grades make adult-like decisions about routine therapeutic and educational matters, even if they are not as competent as adolescents and adults in comprehending and weighing the risks and
benefits of the various alternatives.45 Stated somewhat differently,
children can imitate adult models in making decisions for themselves,
even when they are not prepared cognitively to explain the merits of
those decisions.
Although such studies of actual decisionmaking are most germane
to legal concerns, it should be noted that changes in psychologists' perception§ of children's general competence also have occurred among
basic developmental psychologists. Recent research has shown children to be capable of sociocentric moral reasoning and behavior at earlier age than most developmental psychologists (at least those with a
cognitiVe-developmental bent) had believed possible. Although the attribution of subjective responsibility46 has proven to be one of the
most st.ikingly developmental aspects of moral judgment,47 researchers who have adjusted their methods to account for young children's
poor verbal and free-recall skills have found even preschoolers to apply peiceptions of intentionality of behavior to their moral judg-

ments. 48 Observations of empathy and sympathetic distress among
children in day care centers are also illustrative of the sociomoral

competence of young children, sometimes including toddlers. 49 Indeed, preschoolers refer to others' needs as the basis for their own
naturally occurring prosocial behavior.5 0
44. Kaser-Boyd, Adelman, Taylor & Nelson, Children's Understandingof Risks and
Benefits of Psychotherapy,15 J. CLIN. CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 165 (1986).
45. See, e.g., Lewis, Decision Making Related to Health: When Could/Should Children Act Responsibly?, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT (G. Melton, G.
Koocher & M. Saks eds. 1983); Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 42.
46. In Piaget's seminal theory of moral development, attribution of responsibility on
the basis of intention rather than objective consequences requires sufficient cognitive development that the child is able to comprehend motives of others. Piaget
believed this diminution of egocentricity in moral judgment did not occur until
the child reached middle childhood. See generally J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1965) (originally published in 1932).
47. Lickona, Research on Piaget'sTheory of Moral Development, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND SOCIAL ISSUES 219, 229 (T. Lickona ed. 1976).
48. See, e.g., Austin, Ruble & Trabasso, Recall and Order Effects as Factors in Children's Moral Judgments, 48 CHILD DEV. 470 (1970); Darley, Klosson & Zanna,
Intentionsand Their Contexts in the Moral Judgments of Childrenand Adults. 49
CHILD DEV. 66 (1978). See generally ALTERNATIVES TO PIAGET: CRITICAL ESSAYS
ON THE THEORY (L. Siegel & C. Brainerd eds. 1978).
49. See generally Hoffman, Empathy, Role Taking, Guilt,and Development of Altruistic Motives, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND
SOCIAL ISSUES 124 (T. Lickona ed. 1976).
50. Eisenberg-Berg & Neal, Children'sMoral Reasoning about their Own Spontaneous ProsocialBehavior, 15 DEV. PSYCHOLOGY 228 (1979).
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Similarly, comprehension of physical causality occurs much earlier
than children are able to articulate their understanding of causality
and, therefore, earlier than Piaget believed was possible. "Adult-like"
causal reasoning is well established by age four or five and sometimes
observable even among two- and three-year-old children.51 Thus, concepts of agency and intentionality are within the repertoire even of
young children.
Although such bodies of research cast doubt on the historic presumption of irresponsibility among juveniles, it is important not to
oversell their significance. The capacity to perceive and evaluate the
intentionality of behavior does not translate directly into the capacity
to form criminal intent.52 Moreover, some of the research by Piagetian critics that shows children capable of higher-level reasoning than
cognitive-developmental theorists typically assumed requires unusual
conditions. That children may be able to demonstrate higher-level
reasoning when the task is presented nonverbally or the demands on
memory are minimized probably has little relevance to the law's view
of children's maturity.
Similarly, research on juveniles' competence in decisionmaking is
not completely apposite to questions of their responsibility. On the
one hand, the cognitive requirements for compliance with the criminal
law probably are generally less advanced than the informationprocessing skills needed to make rational decisions about one's physical and economic welfare. On the other hand, the threshold for personal responsibility should be higher than the threshold for exercise
of self-determination. Thus, in considering questions of responsibility,
we should be sensitive to developmental trends in judgment that we
may find irrelevant to the question of whether interests in liberty are
to be recognized and protected in nonpunitive situations. I shall consider these pQints in turn.
b.

The Low Expectations of the Criminal Law

As Stephen Morse has argued in his discussions of the relationship
between mental disability and personal responsibility, the expecta51. Bullock, CausalReasoning and Developmental Change over the Preschool Years,
28 HUM. DEv. 169 (1985); Bullock, Preschool Children's Understandingof Causal
Connections, 2 BRIT. J. Dgv. PSYCHOLOGY 139 (1984).
52. Some psycholegal commentators on children's responsibility have failed to make
this distinction clearly. See, e.g., Keasey & Sales, An Empirical Investigation of
Young Children'sAwarenessand Usage of Intentionalityin CriminalSituations,
1 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 45 (1977). Besides the fact that different levels and perhaps even different types of intent are relevant in the domains of psychology and
law, the equation of capacity to form criminal intent and laboratory demonstrations of understanding of intentionality ignores the additional moral elements in
the former. Attribution of responsibility surely rests on more than an ability to
consider subjective factors in assessing blame.
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tions of moral behavior that are established in the criminal law generally are quite low. 5 3 The foundation for this conclusion is especially
clear when one considers the lack of obvious legal significance of infantile moral reasoning. The lowest level of moral development often
is said to be an evaluation of the morality of conduct in terms of its
personal consequences. 5 4 Although few would seek a society in which
citizens refrained from mala in se only because of the threat of punishment, such a perspective is deeply embedded in the deterrent purpose of the criminal law.55
In a classic essay, Justice Holmes even argued that such a purpose
is the sine qua non of law:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge
enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct,
56
whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.

To A large extent, as a society, we do not care that prospective
criminals obey the law for reasons that are not morally praiseworthy.
We do riot punish unethical states of mind absent illegal conduct. Similarly, we probably would be satisfied if all citizens obeyed the law,
even if they did so because they expected the approbation of their
57
peers.
At the same time, we have few qualms about punishing those who
break the law because they have calculated that the risk of punishment is insufficient to warrant foregoing the short-term personal
gains often associated with antisocial behavior. Most of us feel little
guilt about punishing offenders who are so egocentric that they appear
insensitive to the effects of their crimes on the victims, but who are
not so socially inept that they are unaware of the community's condemnation of their behavior.58 Indeed, our moral intuition tells us
that such "cold-blooded" behavior is especially blameworthy.
Our intuition is confirmed to some extent by the fact that most
elementary-school-age children and even some preschool children are
53. Morse, Crazy Behavior,Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law,
51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527 (1978); Morse, supra note 35.
54. See, e.g., Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental

Approach, in MORAL

DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND SO-

CIAL IssuES 31 (T. Lickona ed. 1976).
55. See generally Gibbs, Deterrence Theory and Research, in 33 NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIVATION: THE LAW AS A BEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT (G. Melton ed. 1985).

56. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
57. Evaluation of the morality of an event based on the positive consequences and
resulting positive emotion associated with it occurs even in early childhood. Hoffman, supra note 49; Kohlberg, supra note 54.
58. Many sex offenders have little appreciation of the impact of their behavior on the
victims, and they often fail to comprehend fully why society is outraged by their
behavior. See, e.g., A. GROTH, MEN WHO RAPE:
FENDER (1979).
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capable of reaching the same conclusion.5 9 Consideration of intent,
including hedonistic or exploitive motives, does not require high levels
of cognitive development or educational achievement. For that matter, actual conformity to the primary behavioral norms of the community requires even less sociomoral development. Even young children
are not inclined to adopt physically dangerous means of responding to
slights by their peers. Similarly, the lack of a substantial relationship
between age and honesty6O demonstrates that children understand the
rules of an orderly society at a very young age and are capable of responding accordingly, whatever their motive for doing so. From an
early age, children can imitate normative social behavior.61
c.

The Lack of Congruence Between Competence
and Responsibility

Although the preceding discussion shows that the social expectations embedded in the criminal law generally do not rest on advanced
developmental levels, the fact that juveniles appear more competent
decisionmakers than the law historically has presumed does not imply
that youth generally should be held fully accountable by the state for
their misdeeds. I reach that conclusion even though I have argued
elsewhere that the new research and theory on minors' competence
should be used to establish lower age thresholds for legal recognition
of the validity of their decisions.62

The age thresholds for recognition of autonomy and privacy, cessation of special age-based entitlements, and establishment of criminal
responsibility need not be, indeed should not be, the same.6 3 Respect
for personhood demands that we err on the side of promotion of autonomy. Therefore, the presumption should be in favor of self-determination and those special entitlements that assist youth in
developing the capacity for full exercise of autonomy, but doubt about
criminal (or quasicriminal) responsibility should be resolved in the direction of nonresponsibility.
59. L. Sametz, A Child's Use of Distributive Justice as a Function of the Child's Cognitive Level (paper presented at the meeting of the Society for Research in Child

Development, Apr. 1981).
60. Burton, Honesty and Dishonesty, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND SOCIAL ISSUES 173, 179-80 (T. Lickona ed. 1976).
61. See generally Mischel & Mischel, A Cognitive Social-LearningApproach to Morality and Self-Regulation, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR: THEORY,
RESEARCH, AND SOCIAL ISSUES 84 (T. Lickona ed. 1976).
62. See, e.g., Melton, Toward "Personhood"forAdolescents: Autonomy and Privacy
as Values in Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99 (1983).
63. This point is developed in substantially more detail in Melton, Are Adolescents
People? Problems of Liberty, Entitlemen and Responsibility, in THE ADOLESCENT AS DECISION-MAKER: APPLICATIONS To DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION (J.

Worell & F. Danner eds. 1989).
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Advocating a "jurisprudence of semi-autonomy" that treats adolescence "as a learner's permit," Franklin Zimring has reached the same
conclusion. 64 He has argued convincingly that it is unfair to hold adolescents accountable for their behavior at the same level that we hold
adults. When the state systematically has denied adolescents experience in decisionmaking, it is unreasonable for society to expect the
same quality of decisionmaking from adolescents that it expects from
adults, even if adolescents typically have the same capacity to assess
and weigh the risks and benefits of various alternatives.
Professor Zimring's point is rendered more acute by evidence that
there may be subtle differences between adolescents' and adults' appraisal of social situations. David Elkind's description of residual
egocentrism in adolescence is illustrative.65 Adolescents typically are
unrealistically sensitive to others' reactions (what Professor Elkind
terms the "imaginary audience") and insensitive to their own vulnerability (the "personal fable"). Although such differences are insufficient to form legally relevant differences in regard to adolescents'
ability to comprehend and weigh risks and benefits, they may be sufficient t6 cast some doubt about their level of culpability for illegal
behavior.
d.

Some PreliminaryConclusions

As Thomas Lickona has summarized, "[m]oral judgment, as depicted by Piaget, is indisputably developmental; it changes with age
and experience." 66 Nonetheless, the level of moral reasoning expected within the criminal law is achieved by most juveniles at an
early age. At a minimum, the several lines of research showing children and youth to be more competent cognitively and socially than the
law has presumed cast doubt on the assumption that most juveniles
cannot fairly be held accountable for their behavior.
The qualifier to this conclusion, though, is the evidence suggesting
that adolescents may be in a transition stage in terms of criminal responsibility. This qualifier is given special credence by research showing that juvenile delinquents are especially immature. Delinquents
67
usually are less competent socially and cognitively than their peers.
As a result, age may be sufficiently mitigating to support a theory of
only partial responsibility for many adolescents, a point to which I
shall return.
64. F. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE (1982).
65. Elkind, Egocentrism in Adolescence, 38 CHILD DEV. 1025 (1967).
66. Lickona, supra note 47.

67. See infra notes 118-32 and accompanying text.
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Juveniles Are Especially Amenable to Treatment

Even if juveniles can reasonably be presumed to be responsible for
their behavior, a separate system of justice may be a wise policy if
juveniles are especially amenable to treatment. The founders of the
juvenile court certainly assumed such amenability. Using a social construct that continues to creep into public policy,68 the early child savers presumed juvenile offenders to be particularly malleable and,
therefore, predictably responsive to treatment to prevent their future
antisocial conduct. Juvenile crime was perceived as posing relatively
little threat to society, and juveniles were believed to be essentially
innocent in a Rousseauian sense.69 If youth were placed in a benign,
"natural" setting away from the temptations of the modern city, they
could be expected to be restored to their state of innocence and then to
be "civilized" appropriately.T0
The idyllic view of the therapeutic programs planned by the founders of the juvenile justice system is illustrated by Judge Mack's

description:
What is needed is a large area, preferably in the country,--because these children require the'fresh air and contact with the soil even more than does the
normal child,-laid out on the cottage plan, giving opportunity for family life,
and in each
cottage some good man and woman who will live with and for the
71
children.

The perception of delinquents as innocent creatures led astray by
the realities of urban immigrant culture is exemplified by Judge
Mack's reference to the purported therapeutic effects of sending wayward youth to the country. This view is further illustrated by the ease
with which the judge believed that therapeutic change would occur:
A thorough investigation, usually made by the probation officer, will give the
court much information bearing on the heredity and environment of the child.
This, of course, will be supplemented in every possible way; but this alone is
not enough. The physical and mental condition of the child must be known,
for the relation between physical defects and criminality is very close. It is,
therefore, of the utmost importance that there be attached to the court, as has
been done in a few cities, a child study department, where every child, before
hearing, shall be subjected to a thorough psycho-physical examination. In
hundreds of cases the discovery and remedy of defective eyesight or hearing or
some slight surgical operation will effectuate a complete change in the charac72
ter of the lad.
In such a view, the traditional strictures of the legal process were
inapposite, because delinquency was at root a medical problem that
demanded expert diagnosis and treatment, not a moral/social problem
68. See Melton, The Clashing of Symbols: Prelude to Child and Family Policy, 42
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 345, 350 (1987).
69. See J. ROUSSEAU, EMILE (Dutton ed. 1955) (originally published in 1762).
70. See J. KET, supra note 27, at 100.
71. Mack, supra note 28, at 114.
72. Id. at 120.
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that required just resolution. In such a context, social workers, doctors, and even "wise and merciful" substitute fathers73 were legitimately more at home than were lawyers intent on using the skills of
their profession. The guts of the juvenile court were to be in its ancillary clinics and training schools, not in the trappings of due process
and legal authority.
In Kent 74 and Gault,75 the Supreme Court refused to accept the
fiction that such good intentions had necessarily-or even often-resulted in therapeutic procedures and effects. Juvenile offenders were
subjected to the "worst of both worlds,"7 6 a deprivation of due process
based on the promise of a treatment that often was harshly punitive.
Unfortunately, the reality noticed in Kent and Gault is not radically different today. The "treatment" available through the juvenile
77
justice system often remains little more than brutal punishment.
Class action suits in the 1970s and 1980s have illuminated inhumane
conditi6ns in numerous juvenile correctional facilities and in many
adult j.Uils where juveniles also are held.78 In fact, substantial change
is only beginning to occur in many communities where the threat of
personal liability now looms for state and local officials who fail to
comply with the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act's
mandate to remove juveniles from adult jails.79

Too often, in fact, the situation at the time of Gault has been exacerbated by the growth of the child mental health and social service
professions. The child mental health system has become an increasingly misused instrument of state intrusion into the lives of youth and
73. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.

74. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
75. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
76. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566 (1966).
77. See, e.g., K. WOODEN, WEEPING IN THE PLAYTIME OF OTHERS (1976).
78. See Soler, Litigationon Behalf of C'hildren in Adult Jails, 34 CRIME & DELINQ.

190 (1988), and cases cited therein.
79. Hendrickson v. Griggs, 672 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. Iowa 1987); Swanger, Hendrickson
v. Griggs: A Review of the Legal and Policy Implicationsfor Juvenile Justice
Policymakers, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 209 (1988).

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act and the Hendrickson
case present new opportunities for reform of the juvenile justice system, if not of
the juvenile court itself. It remains to be seen, though, whether the response to
such opportunities will be more of the same (i.e., construction of juvenile detention centers instead of housing in adult jails) or new, less restrictive approaches to
the prevention and remediation of juvenile delinquency. The raft of juvenile justice bills introduced in the 1989 session of the Nebraska Legislature was illustrative. Compare, e.g., LB 493 (a proposal by Sen. Arlene Nelson and five other
senators to authorize the Department of Corrections to operate juvenile detention facilities) with LB 663 (proposed Juvenile Services Act, introduced by Sen.
Sandy Scofield and 10 other senators, to provide an array of family- and community-based services for juvenile offenders).
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their families. 8 0 Without doubt, the scope of the juvenile justice system has expanded as private therapeutic facilities have become available for placement.S1 Indeed, some of the most egregious abuse of
juveniles placed as a result of their misbehavior has been as part of
purported treatment.8 2 For example, one high-priced, highly professionalized center that received youth from juvenile courts all over the
country subjected them to lie detectors to determine whether their
thinking was "correct," forced them to stand or sit at attention when it
was not, and engaged in rather innovative physically abusive proce83
dures supposedly intended to quiet upset youth.
The problem with the implementation of the rehabilitative ideal,
though, is not simply a matter of perversion of the juvenile court's
purported purpose. Even when the court's therapeutic purpose has
been taken seriously, its efficacy has not been demonstrated. As a
panel of the National Academy of Sciences concluded, the assertion
that "nothing works" in juvenile (and adult) corrections still has not
been persuasively refuted.8 4 The most well-validated treatment for
80. See generally Morse & Whitebread, Mental Health Implications of the Juvenile
Justice Standards,in LEGAL REFORMS AFFECTING CHILD AND YOUTH SERVICE

(G.

Melton ed. 1982).
81. See, e.g., G. MELTON & W. SPAULDING, No PLACE TO Go: CIVIL COMMITMENT OF
MINORS (in press); Jackson-Beeck, Schwartz & Rutherford, Trends and Issues in
Juvenile Confinementfor Psychiatricand Chemical Dependency Treatment, 10
INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 153 (1987); Krisberg, Schwartz, Litsky & Austin, The
Watershed of Juvenile Justice Reform, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 5 (1986); Lerman,
Trends and Issues in the Deinstitutionalizationof Youths in Trouble, 26 CRIME &
DELINQ. 281 (1980); Rutherford, The Boundariesof Child Welfare in England, in
RETHINKING CHILD WELFARE (J. Gilgun, I. Schwartz, G. Melton & Z. Eisikovits

eds.)(in press).
82. See Melton & Davidson, Child Protectionand Society: When Should the State
Intervene?, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 172 (1987).
83. Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982).
84. THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (L.

Sechrest, S. White & E. Brown eds. 1979). See also NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS (S. Martin, L. Sechrest & R. Redner eds.
1981) (examining directions for rehabilitation programs that theory suggests may
be most profitable). The National Academy task panel saw no reason for belief
that juvenile delinquents would be especially amenable to treatment:
It may be implicitly assumed by many that age is an important element
in classification because it is, or should be, easier to rehabilitate youthful
offenders. That seems a dubibus prospect at best. By any measure currently available, rates of involvement in criminal activity subsequent to
adjudication are at least as high for juveniles as for adults with similar
offense histories. It could be argued that given the same circumstances it
might be more difficult to rehabilitate juveniles than adults because
their very youth is indicative that they have no prolonged periods of satisfactory behavior patterns to which they might be restored by proper
treatment. In fact, however, very little is known about differential treatment or potential for rehabilitation of juveniles and adults. Certainly
when the treatment methods that have been employed are examined,
there do not appear to have been any startling differences between what
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delinquent behavior remains getting older!8 5
It may be argued that this dismal picture reflects inadequate re-

sources, poorly conceptualized treatment programs, and failure to protect program integrity in evaluation studies, rather than intrinsic
ineffectiveness of treatment. To a large extent, I agree. Some of the
most highly touted negative evaluation studies have focused on programs so poorly developed and staffed that no one reasonably could
have expected them to work.86 Most serious juvenile offenders have a
multiplicity of significant, persistent problems-educational delays,
family disorganization, a lack of community support, economic pov-

erty, poor social skills, and aberrant social perceptions and expectancies.8 7 Some small experimental programs that have incorporated an
intensive, integrated response to such problems have shown success. 88

85.

86.
87.

88.

has been tried with juveniles and adults. The one exception is temporary foster home placement of juveniles, but that tactic has never been
subjected to a controlled test of its efficacy.
THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, supra
at 50-51.
A background paper commissioned by the panel concluded that early exercise
of punitive sanctions through the juvenile justice system also was likely to have
little deterrent effect. Klein, A JudiciousSlap on the WrisL" Thoughts on Early
Sanctionsfor Juvenile Offenders, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE REHABILITATION OF
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 376, 392 (S. Martin, S. Sechrest & R. Redner eds. 1981).
Partly as a result of such dismal analyses, Congress, with the apparent blessing of the Supreme Court, has rejected rehabilitation outright as a goal for adult
corrections, at least when institutionally based. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.
Ct. 647 (1989). In the absence of evidence of efficacy, treatment planning as a
base for sentencing decisions was found to be "a serious impediment to an evenhanded and effective operation of the criminal justice system." Id. at 656. In the
current state of the art, such an argument applies with equal force to juvenile
corrections.
See, e.g., G. MELTON & D. HARGROVE, PLANNING MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR
CHILDREN AND YOUTH ch. 2 (in press)(conduct disorders tend to be persistent
across time and pervasive across situations); J. MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT
BEHAVIOR 72-73 (1981); L. ROBINS, DEVIANT CHILDREN GROWN UP: A SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC STUDY OF SOCIOPATHIC PERSONALITY (1966).
Quay, The Three Faces of Evaluatzon: What Can Be Expected to Work, 4 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 341 (1977).
For reviews of the relevant epidemiological literature, see G. MELTON & D.
HARGOVE, supra note 85; M. RUvrER & H. GILLER, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY:
TRENDS AND PERSPECTIVES (1984).
For a comprehensive review of the treatment outcome literature, see G. MELTON
& D. HARGROVE, supra note 85, at ch. 3. For examples of promising programs, see
I. GOLDENBERG, BUILD ME A MOUNTAIN: YOUTH, POVERTY, AND THE CREATION
OF NEW SETTINGS (1971); Henggeler, Rodick, Borduin, Hanson, Watson & Urey,
Multisystemic Treatment of Juvenile Offenders: Effects on Adolescent Behavior
and Family Interaction,22 DEV. PSYCHOLOGY 132 (1986); Shore & Massimo, Fifteen Years after Treatment" A Follow-up Study of Comprehensive Vocationally
Oriented Psychotherapy,49 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 240 (1979).
All of the programs that have demonstrated lasting success in treating youth
with persistent and pervasive behavior problems have been small and intensive.
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Recent studies of youth who have spontaneously ended delinquent careers also have provided new directions for experimentation in services for delinquents.8 9
Even if treatment is potentially effective for some delinquents,
though, the argument that the juvenile court's failure really is just a
matter of inadequate investment or careless conceptualization misses
the point. First, even if juvenile justice programs are potentially effective in preventing further crime, at least by some youth, rehabilitation
programs are not differentially effective for juvenile delinquents to a
degree that justifies a separate justice system. Although the claim by
some that adolescence is too late for significant change is simply
wrong, 90 the historic view that youth is a time of great malleability
was equally naive. 91 Most juvenile offenders do not recidivate, no
matter what intervention is provided.92 Insofar as rehabilitation is the
goal, it is hard to justify any court involvement for such youth.
Among those juveniles who are repeat offenders, there is little reason
to expect special amenability to treatment, relative to adult
offenders.93
Second, it must be remembered that the court's primary purpose is
to administer justice. Even an effective rehabilitation system fails in

89.

90.
91.

92.

It is unclear whether they could be adopted on a large scale. No state has yet
tried.
A key to cessation of delinquency appears to be sense of personal efficacy. Mulvey, Cessation of Delinquency as a Worthwhile Research Topic, in 11(1) DIvISION
OF CHILD, YOUTH, & FAMILY SERvIcES NEWSLETTER 4, 14 (1988). An implication
would be that treatment is most likely to be effective when it induces or restores
some measure of personal control by youth, a conclusion that also can be derived
from other areas of psychological research and theory. See, e.g., Melton, Decision
Making by Children: Psychological Risks and Benefits, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE To CONSENT (1983); Tremper & Kelly, The Mental Health Rationalefor
Policies Fostering Minors' Autonomy, 10 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 111 (1987).
Such a process of involvement of youth themselves in making decisions about
their treatment can hardly be said to be endemic to youth corrections.
See Hobbs & Robinson, Adolescent Development and PublicPolicy, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 212 (1982).
See supra note 85. See also K. Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A
Proposal for the Preservation of Children's Legal Rights, at 9-11 (paper presented
at the meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Chicago, Nov. 11,
1988)(serious crime is committed disproportionately by juveniles).
After an exhaustive review of the literature, Professors Rutter and Giller
concluded:
[D]elinquent behavior is very pervasive among children and adolescents,
most delinquency is minor, most youths who commit minor delinquent
acts are not particularly distinctive in their personal characteristics or
family background, and in most cases the delinquency constitutes a passing phase that will come to an end without the need for rigorous
intervention.
M. RTTER & H. GILLER, supra note 87, at 350-51.

93. See, e.g., id. at 361 (noting that antisocial behavior typically begins during adolescence and ceases in young adulthood).
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the end if it undermines due process. The traditional quid pro quo
theory of juvenile law94 denigrates the fundamental interests lost in
the name of treatment. 95 The legal system should be supported in its
preservation of the reality and appearance of justice, no matter what
the consequences are for treatment.96 The fact that the "treatment"
often has been ineffective or even harmful simply compounds the insuit to the integrity of juvenile respondents and their families.
C.

Formal, Adversary Procedures Are Not Conducive to Rehabilitation

The notion that criminal procedure is ill-suited to resolution of
matters pertaining to children, youth, and families is deeply embedded
in the traditions of the juvenile court. Indeed, in the pre-Gault years,
it was easy for juveniles to be committed to a training school without
ever realizing that they had been in court. The image painted by the
words of Judge Mack is illustrative:
The child who must be brought into court should, of course, be made to
knov that he is face to face with the power of the state, but he should at the
samb time, and more emphatically, be made to feel that he is the object of its
care and solicitude. The ordinary trappings of the court-room are out of place
in such hearings. The judge on a bench, looking down upon the boy standing
at the bar, can never evoke a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated at a desk, with
the bhild at his side, where he can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder
and draw the lad to him, the judge, while losing none of his judicial dignity,
97
will gain immensely in the effectiveness of his work.

Even today, juvenile courtrooms often more closely correspond to
the conference rooms of child guidance centers than the courtrooms in
which other matters are heard. The notion persists among professionals and the general public that formal adversary procedures are inconsistent with the psychological well-being of children and youth, a
belief that has been given credence by the Supreme Court.98
In keeping with the historic, still prevalent belief in the innocence
94. Gault repudiated the idea that juveniles' right to due process is properly sacrificed in the name of treatment. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
95. Cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 578 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
96. Of course, those systems that have a legitimate purpose of personal and social
change should not neglect the treatment of troubled and troublesome youth. The
emphasis on pursuit of justice in the legal system need not diminish the commitment of the mental health and child welfare systems to assistance to troubled
youth. Such an emphasis also need not prevent juvenile justice authorities' provision of needed treatment as an element of humane care of those juveniles desiring such services.
97. Mack, supra note 28, at 120.
98. See Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 610 (1979). It is not mere coincidence that the
alternative dispute resolution movement has had its greatest success in legal matters pertaining to children and families. But see Melton, Family and Mental Hospital as Myths: Civil Commitment of Minors, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH,
AND THE LAW (N. Reppucci, L. Weithorn, E. Mulvey & J. Monahan eds. 1984);
Melton & Lind, ProceduralJustice in Family Court"Does the Adversary Model
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and vulnerability of youth, the intuition of many adults is that children and youth develop most fully when they are shielded from conflict-hence, from adversariness. That view is overly simple.
Although chronic exposure to uncontrollableconflict may impair children's development, 99 the opportunity to resolve conflict actually may
enhance psychological growth, especially in older children and youth
who may experience a sense of accomplishment.100 Experience in
decisionmaking also may foster a greater appreciation of diverse
points of view and, therefore, may stimulate legal and moral socialization.' 0 ' Regardless, the reality is that juveniles accused of delinquent
or status offenses already are in a state of conflict with the state and
specific adverse parties, often including their parents. Otherwise,
there would be no reason for court involvement. The question is not
whether to foster conflict in juvenile court, but how to resolve the
conflict already present most fairly.
In that regard, psychological research and theory support the
Gault assumption that the "fundamental requirements of due process" are also the requisites for a psychologically satisfying resolution
of the juvenile's predicament: "[T]he appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short, the essentials of
due process-may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude
so far as the juvenile is concerned."1 02
Indeed, benefit to the family as a whole may accrue from due attention to procedural protections. Even when the parents' and
juveniles' interests are ostensibly in conflict, a structure to assure that
less restrictive alternatives are considered is apt to promote family integrity and parental satisfaction by avoiding unnecessary fractionation
of the family.103 By the same token, affirmative efforts to ensure that

minors have a say in what happens to them increase the likelihood
that treatment will be successful.104 Thus, even if the Constitution did
Make Sense?, in LEGAL REFORMS AFFECTING CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES (G.

Melton ed. 1982).
99. See, e.g., Emery, InterpersonalConflict and the Children of Discordand Divorce,
92 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 310 (1982).
100. See, e.g., DeCharms, Personal Causation and Perceived Control, in CHOICE AND
(1979). See generally STRESS, COPING
CHILDREN (N. Garmezy & M. Rutter eds. 1983).
PERCEIVED CONTROL

AND DEVELOPMENT IN

101. See generally Melton, supra note 89.
102. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967). The psychological evidence on the significance
of due process for children and yoath is discussed in Section III(A) infra.
103. See G. MELTON & W. SPAULDING, supra note 81; Perlin, An Invitation to the
Dance: An EmpiricalResponse to ChiefJustice WarrenBurger's "Time-Consuming ProceduralMinuets" Theory in Parhamv. J. R, 9 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 149 (1981).
104. See, e.g., Adelman, Lusk, Alvarez & Acosta, Competence of Minors to Understand, Evaluate,and Communicate about Their PsychoeducationalProblems, 16
PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RES. & PRAC. 426 (1985); Brigham, Some Effects of Choice on
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not demand recognition of the due process rights of juvenile respondents, preservation of adversary process in juvenile court would be
consonant with the state's interests and therefore justifiable on utilitarian grounds.

D.

Summary: A Bankrupt Legal Theory

A review of the assumptions underlying the juvenile court shows it
to be a bankrupt legal institution. The theories that have guided juvenile law through the twentieth century are without foundation. Adolescents are neither so irresponsible nor so responsive to treatment as
to justify a separate juvenile court. Even if the Constitution permits
an incomplete application of adversary procedures to juvenile court, 105
neither common sense nor psychological research supports the premise that a nonadversary approach to delinquency adjudications would
foster rhore effective treatment.
In short, the juvenile court cannot rest on its historic rationales. If
Gault itself did not result in an outright abolition of the juvenile court,
its logid appears to push toward that end. As the Supreme Court recognized, the traditional juvenile court was inconsistent with constitutional mandates for due protection of the liberty interests of juvenile
respondents. Post-Gault developments give no reason to believe that
public policy is consistent with maintenance of the residue of the historic juvenile court, because the philosophical and empirical foundations fdr the court have been shattered.
Academic Performance, in CHOICE AND PERCEIVED CONTROL (1979); Holmes &
Urie, Effects of Preparing Children for Psychotherapy, 43 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 311 (1975); Lewis, supra note 45; Lewis & Lewis, Improving the Health of Children: Must the Children Be Involved?, 4 ANN. REV. PUB.
HEALTH 259 (1983); Melton, supra note 89; Taylor, Adelman & Kaser-Boyd, Exploring Minors' Reluctance and Dissatisfactionwith Psychotherapy, 16 PROF.
PSYCHOLOGY: RES. & PRAC. 418 (1985); Taylor, Adelman & Kaser-Boyd, Minors'
Attitudes and Competence Toward Participationin PsychoeducationalDecisions,
16 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY: RES. & PRAC. 226 (1985).
The importance of ensuring a voice for juveniles even in emotion-laden decisions is illustrated by the fact that children's participation in decisions about foster placements increases the likelihood that the placements will be successful.
Bush & Gordon, Client Choice and BureaucraticAccountability: Possibilitiesfor
Responsiveness in a Social Welfare Bureaucracy,34(4) J. Soc. ISSUES 22 (1978);
Bush, Gordon & LeBailly, EvaluatingChild Welfare Services. A Contribution
from the Clients, 51 SoC. SERV. REV. 491 (1977).
105. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), made clear that juveniles accused of delinquent
offenses are entitled to the rudiments of an adversary system: e.g., representation by counsel, confrontation of one's accusers, and the privilege against selfincrimination. However, subsequent cases have suggested that some constitutionally mandated elements of criminal procedure may not be required in juvenile
court. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Also, the Supreme
Court has approved of nonadversary procedures in decisionmaking about mental
treatment involving minors. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
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Nonetheless, I do believe that a juvenile court is desirable, but only
if it is a truly new juvenile court fully consistent with the spirit of
Gault. I advocate a juvenile court that has more, rather than fewer,
procedural protections available than in criminal courts. Such a new
court would be based on acceptance of the Gault respect for the personhood of juveniles, combined with a psychological understanding of
children's and adolescents' comprehension of fundamental legal rights
and their (lack of) access to procedures necessary to vindicate those
rights.
III. WHY DUE PROCESS REQUIRES A
NEW JUVENILE COURT
A.

The Developmental Psychology of Procedure
1.

The Salience of Freedom

In constructing a new juvenile court, the most fundamental point
that must be recognized is that liberty and privacy are important to
children and youth, just as they are to adults. Attempts to deny the
moral personhood of children must take into account the fact that the
attributes associated with concern for human dignity are displayed at
a quite young age. Courts cannot legitimately deny rigorous protec06
tion of minors' liberty on the ground that it is unimportant.1
Even very young children find choice to be reinforcing and meaningful.107

More directly germane to the circumstances in which

juveniles' liberty is threatened by the state, even the best residential
treatment programs are experienced as aversive by the children and
youth placed in them. 0 8 The more "institutional" and less normalized
a placement outside the natural family is, the more intense the resulting anger and sense of degradation are.' 0 9
106. But see Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) ("The juvenile's countervailing
interest in freedom from institutional constraints, even for the brief time involved here, is undoubtedly substantial ... , [b]ut that interest must be qualified
by the recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of
custody.").
107. See, e.g., Brehm, The Effect of Adult Influence on Children'sPreferences: Compliance versus Opposition,5 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 31 (1977); Brehm
& Weinraub, Physical Barriers and Psychological Reactance: 2-Year-Olds' Responses to Threats to Freedom, 35 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 830 (1977).
108. See, e.g., E. Roth & L. Roth, Children's Feelings about Psychiatric Hospitalization: Legal and Ethical Implications (paper presented at the meeting of the Am.
Orthopsychiatric Ass'n, Toronto, Apr. 1984).
109. See Bush, Institutionsfor Dependent and Neglected Children: Therapeutic Option of Choiceor Last Resort?, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPsYCHIATRY 239 (1980). See generally L. RIvLiN & M. WOLFE, INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS IN CHILDREN'S LIVES (1985)
(discussing the relationship between institutional invasions of privacy and children's self-esteem).
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2. The Social Psychology of ProceduralJustice
If maintenance of liberty and privacy is important to juveniles,
then it should come as no surprise when they desire procedures that
provide the level of care due in a matter as serious as the potential
diminution of such primary goods. In that regard, the large body of
research and theory on perceived procedural justice should be informative. 110 Encompassing scores of studies, such research has produced
findings that have proven robust across settings, populations, and
methods. To summarize, studies of perceived justice have shown that
perceptions of the fairness of procedures for dispute resolution provide much of the foundation for individuals' overall level of satisfaction with the legal and political systems. Indeed, perceptions of
procedural justice color perceptions of distributive justice (the fairness
of the outcome), especially when the outcome is negative.
Process control-the opportunity for each disputant to have a say
and to present one's case as one sees fit-is the strongest element in
procedural justice. Consequently, both disputants and observers express greater satisfaction with adversary procedures than inquisitorial
ones, even in societies in which the latter predominate in the legal
system. Care in ensuring that underdogs are heard enhances the evaluation of authorities and the institutions they represent.
The second most important element in perceived procedural justice is ethical appropriateness-treating the parties with respect for
their personal dignity."'1

The legal process is viewed more positively

when disputants are treated politely and their rights are protected.
The two remaining factors known to affect perceptions of procedural justice are ones that are well known to legal policymakers: honesty and consistency. People desire to be treated forthrightly;
dishonest behavior, especially by those in authority, violates the rudiments of respect for persons and fidelity to social contracts. By the
same token, the most basic considerations of equity demand that parties in like circumstances be treated alike. Decisions should be predictable rather than arbitrary, and they should not be based on
irrelevant personal or social characteristics. An unreliable legal system administers justice ineffectively.
3. Developmental Factorsin Use of ProceduralProtections
Whether the conclusions of social psychological studies of proce110. See, e.g., Leventhal, What Should Be Done with Equity Theory?, in SOCIAL ExCHANGE: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH (1980); Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure,66 CALIF. L. REV. 541 (1978). A lucid comprehensive review of
empirical research on procedural justice is provided in E. A. LIND & T. TYLER,
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).

111. See Tremper, Respectfor the Dignity of Minors: What the ConstitutionRequires,
39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1293 (1988).
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dural justice can be generalized to children and youth is an empirical
question. Unfortunately, few studies have addressed that question.
Nonetheless, the empirical evidence that is available suggests that the
same principles underlie adults' and-children's responses to the legal
system.112 As already noted, even young children appreciate personal
control, and a close corollary would be a desire for a voice in disputes
involving them. Even first graders evaluate the fairness of dispute
resolution at least in part in terms of the procedures used, 113 and older
elementary-school-age children generally understand the basic elements of the adversary process and the reasons for them.11 4 Those
children who understand the process best are also those who are most
likely to perceive it as fair."15
Taken together, the varioug lines of research on procedural justice
give ample reason for care in the means by which complaints against
juveniles are investigated and adjudicated.116 Just as for adults, the
degree of control that juveniles have in the presentation of their cases
and the courtesy with which they are treated by legal authorities are
apt to shape their response to the legal system. Consequently, even if
not mandated by ethics and the Constitution, the preservation of due
process in juvenile court would be important in order to socialize respect for the law as an institution. The appearance of fairness is at
least as important in juvenile court as in other legal contexts.
At the same time, though, research suggests that due process for
juveniles may be different from that for adults. Evidence from
Thomas Grisso's program of research on juveniles' waivers of rights is
112. For more extensive discussions of the usefulness of social psychological theory
and research in juvenile and family law, see Melton & Limber, Psychologists'Involvement in Cases of Child Maltreatment-Limits of Role and Expertise, 44 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST- (1989)(in press); Melton & Lind, supra note 98.
113. Gold, Darley, Hilton & Zanna, Children'sPerceptions of ProceduralJustice, 55
CHILD Dsv. 1752 (1984).
114. In a project I am directing that is nearing completion (National Center on Child
Abuse and Neglect Grant No. 90-CA-1274), studies of children in sexual abuse
cases and children in general are showing substantial knowledge of the legal process by the mid-elementary grades, sometimes with greater knowledge of the nature of the adversary process than of relevant legal vocabulary. The notion that
fairness accrues when both parties in a dispute have a say apparently develops
quite early.
115. Perceptions of fairness of the legal process are positively correlated with level of
knowledge about it. 1d.
116. Such research has special meaning, given normative presumptions in favor of respect for the dignity of all persons, regardless of age, and corollary concern for
the just resolution of disputes, especially when primary goods like liberty and
privacy are at stake. In such an ethical and legal framework, hypotheses from
relevant research about the means of enhancing justice should be given serious
consideration, even when they have not been conclusively demonstrated. In any
event, as discussed infra, there is a solid theoretical and empirical foundation for
such hypotheses in regard to procedural justice in childhood and adolescence.
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especially persuasive in that regard. 117 In brief, such studies have
shown that juvenile respondents rarely assert their fifth and sixth
amendment rights; their parents are typically ineffective advocates or
even adversaries; they often do not understand key words in the Miranda warning; they often do not comprehend critical phrases in such
warnings; and experience in the legal system, by itself, does not alleviate such deficiencies.
Such findings stand in contrast to research on adolescents' decisions in other legally relevant contexts, which almost uniformly has
shown youth to be substantially more competent in decisionmaking
than the law presumes.11 8 The reason for the inconsistency of findings in research on waivers of rights in delinquency proceedings with
those in studies of decisionmaking by adolescents in other situations is
not entirely clear.119 Such a discrepancy probably reflects social class
differences to some extent.1 20 However, the hypothesis that social
class accounts for most of the variability is rendered less plausible by
the relatively greater displays of competence in some other settings
that involve disadvantaged youth in serious decisions.12 '
Particular institutional variables may make adolescents appear to
be poo decisionmakers in juvenile court. There is a strong cultural
belief that "talking" mitigates children's responsibility for misdeeds,
whether minor infractions of home or school rules or serious violations o# the law. In a survey of middle-class parents of adolescents,
117. Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive MirandaRights: An EmpiricalAnalysis,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134 (1980); Grisso, Juveniles'Consent in DelinquencyProceedings, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT (1983); Grisso & Lovinguth, Lawyers and Child Clients: A Callfor Research, in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: LEGAL
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (J. Henning ed. 1982). Professor Grisso's
work is summarized and its significance analyzed in detail in Melton, Making
Room for Psychology in MirandaDoctrine: Juveniles' Waiver of Rights, 7 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 67 (1983).
118. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. Ironically, the law has presumed
greatercompetence of adolescents involved in delinquency investigations and adjudications than of adolescents making decisions in other contexts in which research has shown them to be as competent as adults. Compare, e.g., Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979) (waiver of Miranda
rights by a 16-year-old defendant held valid), and Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979) (minors, including adolescents, presumed generally unable to make good
decisions about mental health treatment). Fare and Parham were decided the
same day.

119. See Melton, supra note 117, at 81-82.
120. Research has shown children's level of reasoning about their rights and their
willingness to assert a right to be related to social class. See, e.g., Melton, Children's Concepts of their Rights, 9 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 186 (1980).
Such group differences are probably related to class differences in the degree that
entitlement is actually experienced. See R. COLES, PRIVILEGED ONES (1977).
121. Lois Weithorn's work, currently in preparation for publication, shows adolescents
in psychiatric facilities to be at least as competent as adult patients in decisionmaking about treatment.
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Professor Grisso found that about one-third would advise their children to confess to police, and about one-half of the remainder said that
youth should remain silent temporarily until things "cool down" so
that the story could be related in a calm atmosphere.122 In actual interrogations, parents of juvenile respondents rarely advised their children to remain silent; in fact, the majority did not give any advice or
counsel to their children involved in an undeniably difficult situation.12 3 The picture of the outcome is consistent: juveniles rarely invoke their constitutional rights, and younger juveniles (those under
age 16) almost never do.124
Professor Grisso's studies suggest that juveniles' difficulties in applying their rights in delinquency proceedings emanate most directly
from a belief that those rights are not rights at all, but instead are
privileges revocable by people in authority.12 5 This "immature" belief
may be the product of true age differences in reasoning, 126 but it also
may reflect an accurate perception of reality in many juvenile
courts1 27 and within many relationships between juvenile respondents
128
and their attorneys.
Still another explanation for the apparent incompetency of many
juveniles in asserting their rights in delinquency proceedings is that
many respondents may lack the cognitive skills of most of their peers.
Two specific findings lend credence to this interpretation. First, even
the oldest juveniles appeared less competent than adults in Professor
Grisso's study when the juveniles had IQs less than eighty. Second,
there is a high prevalence of learning disabilities among adjudicated
juvenile delinquents, despite the fact that learning disabled youth are
not disproportionately prone to delinquent behavior, as measured by
both self-report and police contacts.129 The latter finding suggests
that juveniles who are less cognitively and socially adept are also less
able to take advantage of options for diversion, whether because of
122. T. GRisso, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 180-82 (1981).
123. Id- at 185-86.
124. Id. at 34-37.
125. Id. at 129-30.
126. See Melton, supra note 120.
127. See, e.g., I. SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: RETHINKING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, 148-66 (1989).
128. Despite the fact that In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), leaves no question that the
juvenile court should be an adversary institution, the proper role of attorneys in
juvenile court continues to be a matter of controversy and ambiguity. See generally INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES (1976).
129. N. DUNIVANT, A CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEARNING
DISABILITIES AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1984); N. DUNIVANT, IMPROVING ACADEMIC SKILLS AND PREVENTING DELINQUENCY OF LEARNING-DISABLED JUVENILE
DELINQUENTS: EVALUATION OF THE ACLD REMEDIAL PROGRAM (1984).
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their own lack of adroitness in maneuvering through the juvenile justice system or the appearance (perhaps accurate) that they will be relatively unamenable to treatment.
Whatever the reasons for the apparent incompetence of many
youth in the juvenile justice system in exercising their rights, there
can be no question of its adverse consequences. Not only do juveniles
often waive their rights to silence and counsel during interrogation,
they often are not represented by counsel at any stage of the
proceeding.130
B.

A Psychological Approach to Due Process
1.

Dual-Maximal Doctrine

After Gault, it is indisputable that the state's position is adverse to
juvenil respondents in delinquency proceedings and that minors' liberty is protected by the Constitution. In such a context, defenders of
the juvenile court can offer no coherent justification in response to
Irene Nferker Rosenberg's plaintive "question why, in view of age and
competency differentials, the child is given less [procedural] protection rather than more."1s
As Professor Rosenberg persuasively argued, the logic of Gault implies a "dual-maximal approach" that combines "fundamental fairness" and "functional equivalence" in determining the procedures
constitutionally necessary to protect the interests of juvenile respondents.132 In other words, in recognition of the obligation to provide
due process, juveniles accused of delinquent offenses should be provided those rights that are necessary to fundamental fairness, even
when such rights exceed those possessed by criminal defendants. At
the same time, though, juvenile respondents should have all of the
rights available to adult defendants, even those not necessarily a part
of fundamental fairness as applied to adults, because juvenile proceedings are functionally equivalent to criminal trials. The dual-maximal
approach is desirable because "it applies to children all the guarantees
already applicable to adult criminal defendants, while also permitting
enhanced protection of children because of their vulnerability and im130. I. SCHWARTZ, supra note 127, at 153-57. Case law originating in criminal cases

shows unmistakably that the requisites for competency to waive the right to
counsel are stringent, indeed higher than for any other competency in the criminal process. See G. MELTON, J. PETRILLA, N. POYTHRESS & C. SLOGOBIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS:

A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH

PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 99-100 (1987) and cases cited therein. Therefore, it
is hard to believe that juvenile courts are exercising due care in accepting waivers
of respondents' right to counsel.
131. Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 659.
132. Id. at 661-73. See also Feld, CriminalizingJuvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure

for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141 (1984).
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maturity without making the additional protection automatically
133
available to adults."
2. An Example: The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination
The implications of Professor Rosenberg's theory, to which I also
subscribe, can be demonstrated by analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Farev. Michael C.134 In Fare,the Supreme Court held that a
juvenile's request for his probation officer during police interrogation
was not per se an invocation of Miranda135 rights. Further, applying a
totality-of-the-circumstances test, the Court held that Michael C. had
made a competent waiver of his rights. The Court did so despite the
facts that Michael C. had suspected that any attorney provided by the
police would in fact be an undercover police officer;136 that he trusted
and asked for his probation officer;1 3 7 and that he was immature, emotional, and uneducated. 138 Michael C.'s request for the assistance of a
trusted adult was functionally equivalent to an adult's request for an
attorney and should have been regarded as an invocation of the right
to silence and the corollary right to counsel under Miranda.139 Indeed, Professor Grisso's findings about the misunderstanding of fifth
Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 671.
442 U.S. 707, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 710-11, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979).
Michael's probation officer had advised Michael to contact him whenever he had
a police contact. Id. at 712.
138. This description of Michael was provided by Justice Powell, id. at 733, who concurred that a request for a probation officer is not per se an invocation of Miranda rights, but who dissented from the holding that Michael had made a
competent waiver of his rights.
139. See Melton, supra note 117, at 74-76. The Court was concerned that recognition
of a juvenile's request for a probation officer as an invocation of the right to silence would open the door to similar rules regarding "one's football coach, music
teacher or clergyman." Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 714, reh'g denied, 444
U.S. 887 (1979). However, such an expansion is a logical corollary to the fifth
amendment-based right to counsel under Miranda. After all, when an adolescent
has never been permitted independently to contract for professional services
before, why should he be expected to call an attorney when he is in the unusual
and difficult situation of interrogation for a serious crime?
If the assistance of counsel is needed to render the privilege against self-incrimination meaningful for competent adults, surely such protection should also
be available to juvenile suspects. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967)("It would
indeed be surprising ffthe privilege against self-incrimination were available to
hardened criminals but not to children."). As a practical matter, to achieve such
protection absent automatic provision of counsel during interrogation, a court
should treat a juvenile's request for a trusted adult in terms of both its plain
meaning (i.e., access to the adult friend or relative should be provided) and its
implicit meaning of a request for legal assistance (i.e., interrogation should be
halted until the juvenile's attorney is present and advises his or her client to
"talk").
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
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and sixth amendment rights that is endemic among juvenile respondents logically lead further: confessions of juveniles should not be admitted unless counsel was present during interrogation. 140
Although the privilege against self-incrimination may be unnecessary to fundamental fairness,141 the doctrine of functional equivalence
ensures that juveniles are provided at least those rights that are owed
criminal defendants. Once the right has been applied, the doctrine of
fundamental fairness requires that its application is meaningful. The
latter doctrine leads in some circumstances to rights that are broader
for juveniles than for similarly situated adults.
Therefore, not only should the right to silence be unwaivable by
juveniles without the advice of counsel, but the right to counsel itself
should not be waivable by juveniles except in extraordinary cases, if at
all. 142 tndeed, the policy of promotion of the appearance and fairness
of adjudication of charges of delinquency implies the need for a juvenile cotirt, but the court should be a "super-court" rather than a quasisocial-sarvice agency dispensing a watered-down form of justice.
3.

The Need for EmpiricalData

In designing the new juvenile court, the overarching question
should be the nature and scope of procedures needed to ensure both
that respondents are treated fairly and that they feel they are being
treated fairly. In other words, legal policymakers should explore the
procedural forms necessary to make justice meaningful, in all senses
of that word.
For example, the Supreme Court has refused to extend the right to
a jury trial to juveniles. 143 It has done so because of a nostalgic desire
to save a court whose time has passed. 44 If Gault were to be taken
140. Grisso, supra note 117, at 1161-63.
141. Rosenberg, supra note 20, at 668-71. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 65-78 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142. As already noted, supra note 130, fair application of existing law affecting criminal defendants should result in few, if any, valid waivers of counsel by juvenile
respondents. Nonetheless, data on the frequency of waivers permitted by juvenile courts, supra note 130, indicate the need for a stronger standard therein.
I recognize that such an approach would result, in a sense, in fewer rights for
juveniles. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (when the waiver of counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the sixth admendment requires courts
to permit defendants to proceed pro se). However, research on juveniles' waiver
of the right to counsel shows that extraordinary care is necessary if such a waiver
is to be executed competently by a juvenile. The assistance of counsel is so important to an adequate defense that some abrogation of the right to self-representation is likely in most cases to ensure greater protection of juveniles' rights.
143. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
144. Consider the following quote from McKeiver in the light of the Gault attack on
the juvenile court as a "kangaroo court": "There is a possibility, at least, that the
jury trial, if required as a matter of constitutional precept, will remake the juve-
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seriously, there should be no question of the applicability of the sixth
amendment to juveniles under the doctrine of functional equivalence.
Nonetheless, the need to preserve fundamental fairness leaves open
the question whether the jury must be reshaped to fulfill its purposes
when applied to juveniles.45 If the sense of equity that the jury embodies146 is to be preserved for juveniles, then its form may require
some alteration, while not negating the right itself.147
The example of the possible application of the right to trial by jury
raises the broad need for psychological research on juvenile procedure, because evidence now is lacking about the meaningfulness of
particular procedures when applied in juvenile court. Perhaps under
the auspices of the State Justice Institute, the National Center for
State Courts, or a similar organization, a large research program is
needed to test the effects of various procedures; to determine the symbolism of the procedures; and to identify the specific procedures that
are most likely to help juveniles take an active role in their defense,
but that still provide due protection of their interests. The initial attempts to establish a new juvenile court in the spirit of Gault should
be accompanied by appropriate evaluation research 8and should be
modified in keeping with the results of such studies.14

145.

146.

147.

148.

nile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end to
what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding." McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Supreme Court identified the primary purpose of the jury as being the prevention of state oppression, a purpose
that is met through "the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of
guilt or innocence." Id. at 100. It is at least plausible that such "community participation and shared responsibility" is experienced differently when juveniles
are judged.
Id. See also Melton, Introduction: The Law and Motivation, in 33 NEB. SYMP. ON
MOTIVATION: THE LAW AS A BEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT xvii-xviii (G. Melton ed.
1985)(the significance of the jury may rest primarily in the symbolism entailed in
"the expression of the community conscience" and the resulting effects on perceived justice).
An underlying issue in McKeiver may have been the conceptual difficulties in
constituting a jury of a juvenile's peers. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971).
A general need in psycholegal research is for analysis of the effects of various
innovations ("natural experiments") by legislatures and courts by comparing
trends across jurisdictions. Steadman, Mental Health Law and the Criminal Offender. Research Directionsfor the 1990's, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 323, 328 (1987).
The University of Nebraska's Center on Children, Families, and the Law is the
hub of a consortium combining the efforts of similar centers at six universities
and in several professional organziations and policy centers. Such a multistate
consortium is especially well situated to evaluate the impact of significant juvenile reform when some states do begin to take Gault more seriously.
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4. The Role of Counsel
As should be obvious by now, I expect that the range of procedures
necessary to fundamental fairness in juvenile court is sufficiently disparate from criminal court to merit the existence of the former. I do
not expect, though, that a specialized bench is necessary to such a
court.149 The more lawful the court is, presumably the less need there
is for a specialized judiciary.1S0 The sorts of decisions that a judge

must make in the new juvenile court should be similar to those in
criminal courts and, therefore, well within the expertise of generaljurisdiction judges.
On the other hand, there may be a need for a specialized bar in the
new juvenile court. By stating this conclusion I do not mean to imply
that attorneys for juveniles should depart from the role of zealous advocate. It is exceedingly rare that children appear in delinquency proceedings when they are so young that they cannot reasonably instruct
legal cOunsel,151 an event that is likely to be even more uncommon
when the defense of infancy is restored.
Given the just presumption that litigating parties should have the
opportt.nity to have their say,152 ascription of a lesser role to juvenile
clients bstablishes an untenably high threshold for assistance in one's
defensd, as the drafters of the Juvenile Justice Standards recognized:
It has sometimes been suggested that all or most of a juvenile court lawyer's
clientele is not sufficiently mature to instruct counsel in any usual sense and
that counsel must, therefore, usually act as guardian or amicus curiae. The
proponents of this view often tend, however, to equate competence with capacity to weigh accurately all immediate and remote benefits or costs associated with the available options. In representing adults, wisdom of this kind is
not required; it is ordinarily sufficient that clients understand the nature and
purposes of the proceedings, and its general consequences, and be able to formulate their desires concerning the proceeding with some degree of clarity.
Most adolescents can meet this standard, and more ought not to be required of
them. To do so would, in effect, reintroduce the identification of state and
child by 1 5imposing
on respondents an "objective" definition of their
interests. 3

In the instances in which juvenile respondents do not meet such a
149. Even under existing juvenile procedure, the necessity of a specialized bench is
questionable. For example, Nebraska has a traditional juvenile code; see, e.g.,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-245 (1988). Nonetheless, only three Nebraska counties have
separate juvenile courts with specialized judges. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2,111
(1988).
150. The American Bar Association has favored rotation of general-jurisdiction judges
through the juvenile or family court. A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION §§ 1.1 & 2.1 (1980).
151. See A.B.A. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE
PARTIES pt. III & commentary (1980) [hereinafter A.B.A.].
152. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
153. A.B.A., supra note 151, commentary at 8.
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low standard, they should be declared incompetent to proceed. 54
That possibility negates any possible question about cases in which an
attorney might need to move away from an advocate's role.
Attorneys' ethical duty to represent their clients' interests as defined by the client does not mean, of course, that they should abandon
any counseling role.1.5 Indeed, effective representation requires substantial investment of time and effort in educating clients about their
rights and the options available to the court and the clients themselves. When significant misunderstanding or ignorance about such
matters is present, as it often is with juvenile clients, that investment
should increase proportionately.
Effective representation of juveniles does not imply simply an increased allotment of time to counseling. The nature of the counseling
also may be qualitatively different. Attorneys representing juveniles
should be knowledgeable about the nature of common gaps or errors
in juveniles' information about the legal process; the kinds of interventions that are necessary to persuade juveniles that their rights are
indeed entitlements; the range of dispositional alternatives (especially
those that are relatively unrestrictive) available to the court; and the
formal and informal procedural innovations that are useful in promoting juveniles' active involvement in their defense and in ensuring that
they are treated fairly and perceive that they have been so treated.
Beyond such specialized knowledge, obviously including knowledge about the law that is specific to juvenile procedure, attorneys representing juveniles should have skills in relating to young clients.
Specialized clinical courses and clerkships would be desirable.
Whether such expertise can be easily acquired by practicing lawyers who occasionally handle juvenile cases is an empirical question
that ultimately should be answered through empirical research. However, I am skeptical. It is at least plausible that lawyering in the juvenile court--ensuring that juvenile respondents are full adversarieswill require development of a specialized bar.
IV.

THE PROBLEM OF RESPONSIBLITY: A RETURN TO THE
PAST IN THE NEW JUVENILE COURT

If the juvenile court is to be based primarily on protection of the
process due children and youth in an adverse relation to the state,
some consideration still must be given to the problem of responsibility.
Even if the general presumption of irresponsibility that has guided the
juvenile court cannot be justified, surely there are children who are so
154. In re Causey, 363 So. 2d 472 (La. 1979); In re S. W. T., 277 N.W.2d 507 (Minn.
1979). See Grisso, Miller & Sales, Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile Court,
10 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 1 (1987).
155. A.B.A., supra note 151, commentary at 8-9.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:146

immature that their behavior would be properly excused. Although
prosecution in such an instance is unlikely to say the least, a two-yearold accused of assault and battery on a playmate in the sandbox surely
does not deserve criminal punishment, regardless of the malicious,
premeditated manner in which sand was thrown.
As the rehabilitative underpinnings of the juvenile court have
withered away, courts have increasingly been faced with the problem
of determining individual juveniles' responsibility, especially in those
jurisdictions in which punitive purposes have been expressly recognized in juvenile codes. 15 6 In such cases, the question is whether the
existence of a juvenile court, even a punitive juvenile court, obliterates the need to resurrect the defense of infancy that applied in criminal law prior to the invention of an ostensibly benevolent court for
wayward youth.
In the same manner that pre-Gault courts conclusorily rejected
criminal procedural protections in a "civil" juvenile court, some courts
have summarily rejected the application of the defense of infancy
when the juvenile court still exists. For example, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court upheld the finding of delinquency of a twelve-year-old
boy accused of raping a five-year-old girl, despite the respondent's attempt to assert an infancy defense:
Once one accepts the principle that a finding of delinquency or waywardness in a juvenile proceeding is not the equivalent of a finding that the juvenile has committed a crime, there is no necessity of a finding that the juvenile

had such
maturity that he or she knew what he or she was doing was
15 7
wrong.

Dissenting Justice Feldman understood the critical issue, though.
Recalling the United States Supreme Court's insights in Gault,he concluded that failure to provide criminal defenses like the defense of
infancy in juvenile court was necessarily dependent on a ruse:
What the State cannot do is impose criminal sanctions upon a juvenile under

the guise of treatment or rehabilitation, when confinement and incarceration
is the likely or possible result. Allowing criminal prosecution and punishment
... by the simple expedient of calling such prosecution "civil" or "rehabilitative" confers too much dignity on juvenile court euphemisms. It is only to the
love-struck poet that stone walls do not a prison make, nor iron bars a cage.
To the rest of mankind, to be "awarded" to the department of corrections and
put behind stone walls or iron bars is to be in prison, even if it is called "juve156. See Gardner, supra note 34, at 132 n.17, and authorities cited therein.
157. In re Michael, 423 A.2d 1180, 1183 (R.I. 1981). Accord Gammons v. Berlat, 144
Ariz. 148, 696 P.2d 700 (1985). Similar logic was used by a New York family court
that found a nine-year-old boy to be delinquent for having robbed a bank. In re
Robert M., 110 Misc. 2d 113, 441 N.Y.S.2d 860 (Fam. Ct. 1981). The court rejected
the defense's argument that Robert was merely playing, found that he possessed
the relevant mens rea, and refused to consider an infancy defense. See also Jennings v. State, 384 So. 2d 104 (Ala. 1980) (scope of juvenile jurisdiction is a matter
of legislative discretion).

1989]
nile rehabilitation."

A NEW JUVENILE COURT
158

Those courts that have found the defense of infancy to apply in
juvenile court often have seemed to take a result-oriented approach
that may have satisfied the court's sense of justice in the particular
case but failed to address fully the principle at issue. For example, in
finding that the New York Family Court Act does not obliterate common-law presumptions in regard to the defense of infancy, a family
court judge gave a colorful account of the adjudication of an eightyear-old boy charged with burglary and possession of stolen
property: 159
Standing at full height, the top of Andrew's head barely clears the counsel
table in the courtroom.
One look at this respondent is sufficient to prompt the conclusion that the
juvenile justice system clearly was not designed for his level of maturity and

development. Despite the fact that he meets the technical definition of the
jurisdictional statute [regarding age] ....the court has serious doubts that he
liability or any facets of the
is capable of understanding concepts of criminal
1 60
judicial process in which he finds himself.

Similarly, even though faced with a specific statutory disavowal of
the defense of infancy, 1 61 a New Jersey court dismissed charges of aggravated sexual assault against three boys, aged six through nine, who
had forcibly penetrated the vagina of a six-year-old girl with their fingers.' 62 The court found that the boys were incapable of understanding the "intangible elements" and "symbolic knowledge" required for
a "knowing sexual penetration."163 The court concluded that the
state's interests would not be harmed by a failure to assume jurisdiction over "juveniles who are simply too young to be capable of behavior needful of state oversight."164
One state supreme court has given forthright attention to the implications of Gault for consideration of juveniles' responsibility for delinquent behavior. In the state with a juvenile justice system most
closely tailored to fit a retributive model,165 the Washington Supreme
158. Gammons v. Berlat, 144 Ariz. 148, 154, 696 P.2d 700, 705 (1985) (Feldman, J.,
dissenting).
159. In re Andrew M., 91 Misc. 2d 813, 398 N.Y.S.2d 824 (Fain. Ct. 1977).
160. Id. at 814, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 825. The court's opinion was not purely result oriented.
Noting the compatibility between post-Gault conceptions of the juvenile court
and recognition of the defense of infancy, the court concluded that the idea that
the juvenile court is "almost criminal" is "a historical vestige with roots in preGault philosophy which falls in the face of the reality of minimum periods of
secure incarceration" required under recent legislation. Id. at 815, 398 N.Y.S.2d at
826.
161. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West 1982).
162. State ex rel. C.P. & R.D., 212 N.J. Super. 222, 514 A.2d 850 (Super. Ct. Ch.Div.

1986).
163. Id. at 233, 514 A.2d at 856.
164. Id.
165. See WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 13.04-13.06.010 (Supp. 1988).
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Court unanimously held that the newly defined "criminal nature" of
66
juvenile proceedings made the infancy defense applicable.1
Assuming, as Gault makes clear, that juvenile proceedings are
quasicriminal, the defense of infancy should be available to those children who fall within its historic bounds. Complete exoneration of
some children does not mean, though, that those youth who are responsible for their misdeeds should be subject to the full force of the
criminal law. As I have already discussed, recognition that juveniles
are responsible still leaves room for mitigation because of immaturity.167 Although such a partial responsibility theory could be accommodated within criminal courts by an age-graded sentencing
scheme,168 it also is consistent with the model of a new juvenile court
which I am proposing.169 If juveniles are to be subjected to any punishment, then they should be provided the protections embedded
within briminal procedure, modified as necessary to ensure that such
procedures meet the special demands of fundamental fairness as applied td youth.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

Deskite the fact that the juvenile court is a relatively recent development in Anglo-American jurisprudence, it has seemed firmly established as a stable legal institution. It has remained so even though its
underlying assumptions have been discredited, many of its unique features were eliminated by Gault and its progeny, and the court's remaining special aspects have been the object of criticism from both the
left and the right.
The time has come to take seriously the message of Gault and to
institute procedures designed to facilitate justice for juveniles accused
of delinquent behavior. Mental health professionals long have been
misused in juvenile court to sustain the illusion of a therapeutic institution operating in youth's behalf. Perhaps through critical examination of the court's assumptions and the perceived justice of its
procedures (current and potential), psychologists and other behavioral
scientists can begin to be used in the service of a more just institution
166. State v. Q.D., 102 Wash. 2d 19, 22, 685 P.2d 557, 560 (1984). The Washington
Supreme Court has not been consistent in its recognition of the implications of an
overtly punitive juvenile justice system in that state. See, e.g., State v. Schaff, 109
Wash. 2d 1, 743 P.2d 240 (1987) (right to jury trial does not apply).
167. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
168. Such an approach was taken under the Youthful Offenders Act that formerly
guided sentencing of young adults in federal criminal courts.
169. Although I am arguing on other grounds for maintenance of the juvenile court
(albeit in substantially altered form), my proposal also would satisfy the need
that Professor Gardner has articulated for a separate juvenile court in order to
preserve the appearance of reduced culpability of juvenile offenders. See supra
notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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affecting children and youth. For example, psychologists can assist in
developing and applying the knowledge necessary to teach youth how
to use their rights. Similarly, they can evaluate procedures to determine those that enable youth really to have their say and to feel that
they were treated fairly.
At the same time, withdrawal of reliance on the juvenile court is
likely to make the child mental health and social service systems more
protective of the privacy and autonomy of child clients and thus more
humane and just. Not only have juvenile courts misused mental
health professionals; mental health professionals also have misused
juvenile courts as a coercive "therapeutic" instrument. 170 With a truly
new juvenile court, the integrity of both the justice system and the
human service system is likely to prosper.
In reaching such conclusions, I am mindful of the difficulty of the
task. As Professor Feld noted, "[t]he juvenile court has demonstrated
a remarkable ability to deflect, co-opt, and absorb ameliorative reform
virtually without institutional change."171 Nonetheless, the interests
at stake are fundamental. More than twenty years after Gault, it is
certainly time to consider carefully its implications and to design, evaluate, and implement procedures consistent with meaningful justice
for youth.

170. An example of such an abuse of the juvenile justice system is the practice that I
have observed occasionally of a mental health or social service professional's filing a status offense petition in order to attempt to force another agency to provide
services, pursuant to a court order. Given the statutory label of "children in need
of services" ("CHINS kids") for status offenders in many jurisdictions, what
could be a better example than a child who apparently needs court jurisdiction in
order to receive services? Such a strategy is obviously flawed, though, by its imposition of a de facto punitive sanction against an individual child when "the system" is the culprit. Similar problems are present when agencies attempt to
compensate for their own understaffing by use of the court's "hammer" and staff
resources to ensure that juvenile clients comply with treatment plans.
171. Feld, supra note 132, at 276.

